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Regulation and Resistance in Canadian Bingo Halls: A Socio-Legal
Account
KATE BEDFORD
Le bingo est l’un des principaux angles sous lesquels étudier comment la
réglementation façonne ou non les différentes significations du « jeu », notamment
parce qu’on peut maintenant jouer au bingo dans un climat très distinctif, assujetti à
davantage de règles normalisées. Dans cet article, je me penche sur la façon dont la
transformation de la réglementation provinciale sur le bingo affecte les travailleurs
et travailleuses et les joueurs et joueuses des salles de bingo canadiennes. En
analysant l’interdiction de fumer et les nouveaux règlements concernant la
manipulation de l’argent, je me pose ces questions : Qu’advient-il du bingo et des
caractéristiques démographiques distinctives de ses joueurs et joueuses depuis que
le gouvernement favorise de plus en plus les formes de jeu offertes dans les casinos?
Qu’est-ce que cela peut révéler sur les effets de la réglementation sur les diverses
cultures du jeu? Je tente d’y répondre pour en savoir plus sur la relation des gens
avec la loi sur le jeu dans son application au monde ordinaire plutôt qu’au monde
privilégié. Selon moi, il est capital que les mécanismes réglementaires cherchant à
normaliser les diverses formes de jeu s’interrogent sur les facteurs sociojuridiques
liés au jeu et sur la notion de résistance. Ils doivent aussi être attentifs aux
expériences des travailleurs et travailleuses, et des joueurs et joueuses.
Bingo is a key lens through which to explore how regulation shapes (or fails to shape)
different meanings of gambling, and by extension the different meanings attached to
speculation in everyday life. In Canada, bingo is played in a highly distinctive gambling
environment that is now being subjected to more standardised rules, often drawn
from casinos. In this article, I consider how workers and players in Canadian bingo
halls are affected by shifting landscapes of provincial bingo regulation. By exploring
smoking bans and new rules on touching cash, I ask: what is happening to bingo and
its distinctive player demographic as governments increasingly promote casino forms
of play? What can that teach us about the impact of regulation on diverse gambling
cultures? In posing these questions, I seek to learn more about how people are
interacting with gambling law, in lowly realms rather than big law ones. I argue that
the diverse meanings of gambling are under threat from regulatory homogenization,
specifically from the spread of rules anchored in large-scale, profit-making play
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experiences. I hereby suggest that the lower-level regulatory mechanisms that shape
gambling forms and places need critical, socio-legal interrogation, attentive to worker
and player experiences and accounts of resistance.

THIS ARTICLE STEMS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT that asks what
bingo can add to existing accounts of gambling and political economy.1 Like many critical law
and political economy scholars I am curious about gambling, because the distinctions made by
lawmakers between gambling and legitimate forms of insurance, speculation, and investment
have historically been central to how we understand, and regulate, capitalism.2 More recently,
and more specifically, many scholars have used casinos to think critically about neoliberalism.
While for some casinos are a metaphor of reckless speculation rather than a research site,3
others have explored how casino gambling is materially linked to neoliberalism, both because
it is increasingly used to fund essential services or regenerate impoverished regions in a context
of lower taxes,4 and in terms of the celebratory, individualistic, entrepreneurial approach to risk
involved.5 In particular, destination casino resorts, aimed at attracting visitors, have been
widely promoted as regeneration anchors, including within the US, Holland, Australia, Mexico,
Canada, Macao, South Africa, Cambodia, Laos, and, for a time, the UK.6 In recognition of the
1

See Kate Bedford et al., The Bingo Project: Rethinking Gambling Regulation. Final report (Canterbury, UK:
2016).
Online:
https://www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject/resources/Bingo_Project_report_final.pdf>
[perma.cc/98R4-P262].
2
On how insurance was distinguished from gambling see, inter alia, Geoffrey Wilson Clark, Betting on Lives:
The Culture of Life Insurance in England, 1695-1775 (Manchester University Press, 1999). On stock markets see
Urs Staheli, Spectacular Speculation: Thrills, the Economy and Popular Discourse, translated by Eric Savoth
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013); Marieke De Goede, Virtue, Fortune, and Faith: A
Genealogy of Finance (Minneapolis, Minn: University of Minnesota Press, 2005); Samuel Randalls, “Weather
trading in London: distinguishing finance from gambling” 187 and Claire Loussouarn, “Spread Betting and the
City of London” 233 in Rebecca Cassidy, Andrea Pisac & Claire Loussouarn, eds, Qualitative Research in
Gambling: Exploring the production and consumption of risk (New York: Routledge, 2013).
3
E.g. Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism, new ed (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) expanded
Keynes’ critique of ‘casino capitalism,’ focused on stock markets as risky ‘whirlpools of speculation,’ to discuss
the new products and practices associated with deregulated financial markets, including hedging, spread betting,
and derivatives trading. On the limits of using casinos as metaphors for stock markets see, inter alia, Rebecca
Cassidy, “‘Casino capitalism’ and the financial crisis” (2009) 25:4 Anthropology Today 10. See also Gerda
Reith’s caution against over-use of the casino capitalism analogy, in part because in gambling – unlike in finance
capitalism – the rules of games are fixed, and the probabilities of winning are generally known in advance; Gerda
Reith, “Techno economic systems and excessive consumption: a political economy of ‘pathological’ gambling”
(2013) 64:4 British Journal of Sociology 717 at 720.
4
E.g. Sharon Zukin, Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places, reprint ed (Oxford: OUP USA,
2011); Juan Zhang, “Introduction: Integrated Mega-Casinos and Speculative Urbanism in Southeast Asia” (2017)
90:4 Pacific Affairs 651; Mimi Sheller, “Always turned on: Atlantic City as America’s accursed share” 107 in
Anne M Cronin and Kevin Hetherington, eds, Consuming the Entrepreneurial City: Image, Memory, Spectacle.
(Oxford: Routledge, 2008); James F Cosgrave, “Introduction: Gambling, Risk, and Late Capitalism” 1 in The
Sociology of Risk and Gambling Reader (New York: Routledge, 2006).
5
Cosgrave, ibid; Gerda Reith, The Age of Chance: Gambling in Western Culture (London; New York: Routledge,
2002); Sytze F Kingma, “Paradoxes of risk management: Social responsibility and self-exclusion in Dutch
casinos” (2015) 21:1 Culture and Organization 1.
6
David G Schwartz, Suburban Xanadu : The Casino Resort on the Las Vegas Strip and Beyond (New York ;
London: Routledge, 2003); Kearrin Sims, “Gambling on the Future: Casino Enclaves, Development, and Poverty
Alleviation in Laos” (2017) 90:4 Pacific Affairs 675; Zukin, supra note 4; Linda Hancock, Regulatory failure?:
The Case of Crown Casino (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2011); Kingma, supra note 5; Zhang,
supra note 4; Liu Shih-Diing, “Casino Colony” (2008) 50 New Left Rev 109; Kevin Ward, “Entrepreneurial
urbanism, state restructuring and civilizing ‘New’ East Manchester” (2003) 35:2 Area 116. See also Alexandra
Flynn, “Unequal Spaces of Local Governance in Toronto’s Casino Debates” (2018) 30 Journal of Law and Social
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centrality of casinos to debates about economic restructuring and gambling, Jeffrey Sallaz uses
an ethnography of card dealers in Nevada and Johannesburg casinos to theorize the relationship
between consumers and workers in post-industrial workplaces.7 Ellen Mutari and Deborah
Figart use the stories of casino employees to critique the precarity of life in ‘the casino
economy.’8 Natasha Dow Schüll considers what excessive machine play in Las Vegas casinos
can tell us about the design of addiction.9

I. A BINGO PERSPECTIVE ON GAMBLING REGULATION
While I have learned much from these accounts, casino resorts - with their glamorous allure as
destination spectacles frequented by James Bond - seem distant from the everyday, distinctly
non-Las Vegas worlds of gambling with which I am familiar. Instead, I am drawn to bingo, a
lottery style game popular in many parts of the world about which there is almost no academic
research.10 I am drawn to bingo for many reasons, including that it is one of the few forms of
gambling that attracts more female than male players.11 It is popular with older, working class
women in particular.12 As Stompin’ Tom Connors put it, when the male mine workers in
Sudbury are getting drunk on a Saturday night, “the girls are out to bingo.”13 The game is also
especially popular with Indigenous people in many settler colonial societies, including
Canada.14 Bingo thus provides key insights into classed, aged, racialized, and gendered
gambling cultures, and the ways in which they are shaped by law and regulation.
In addition, bingo is intriguing because in many places it is associated with selforganized mutual aid and charitable fundraising as much as, if not more than, commercial
gambling.15 Hence it is a key example of the point made repeatedly within anthropological and
Policy 68; Alan Littler & Johanna Järvinen-Tassopoulos, “Online Gambling, Regulation, and Risks: A
Comparison of Gambling Policies in Finland and the Netherlands” (2018) 30 Journal of Law & Social Policy 94;
Fiona Nicoll, “Beyond the Figure of the Problem Gambler: Locating Race and Sovereignty Struggles in Everyday
Cultural Spaces of Gambling” (2018) 30 Journal of Law & Social Policy 127.
7
Jeffrey J Sallaz, The Labor of Luck: Casino Capitalism in the United States and South Africa (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2009).
8
Ellen Mutari & Deborah M Figart, Just One More Hand Life in the Casino Economy (Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers 2015)
9
Natasha Dow Schüll, Addiction by Design: Machine Gambling in Las Vegas (Princeton University Press, 2012)
at 6.
10
For key exceptions see Carolyn Downs, A Social, Economic and Cultural History of Bingo (1906-2005)
(Saarbrücken: VDM, 2009), Suzanne Morton, At Odds: Gambling and Canadians, 1919-1969 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2003), C Chapple & S Nofziger, “Bingo!: hints of deviance in the accounts of
sociability and profit of bingo players” (2000) 21:6 Deviant Behaviour 489; Laurie Paarlberg et al, “Charitable
bingo in Indiana: Issues and implications” (2005) 15:4 Nonprofit Management & Leadership Leadership 433;
Mark White, Kitty Rogers Brown & Bevan Dowd, “Bingo in Alabama: More than just a game” (2010) 41 Cumb
Rev 509; Jo-Anne Fiske, “Bingo: Winning and Losing in the Discourses of Problem Gambling” (2015) 57:2
Anthropologica 525. See also Thierry Depaulis “Bingo! A Material history of Modern Gaming” in Manfred
Zollinger, ed, Random Riches: Gambling Past and Present (London: Routledge, 2016) 36 at 49, which is focused
mostly on card gaming, lotteries, betting, and casino gaming, with a few lines devoted to bingo, as a table-based
derivation of a lottery.
11
Rachel A Volberg, “Has there been a ‘feminization’ of gambling and problem gambling in the United States?”
(2003) 8 J Gambling Issues, doi: 10.4309/jgi.2003.8.7.
12
Ibid; See Downs, supra note 10, Morton, supra note 10.
13
Tom Connors, “Sudbury Saturday Night,” The Northlands' Own Tom Connors (1967).
14
See Fiske, supra note 10; Joan L Bottorff et al, “Bingo halls and smoking: Perspectives of First Nations women”
(2009) 15:4 Health Place 1014; Kate Bedford et al., The Bingo Project, supra note 1.
15
On the crucial distinction between charitable fundraising for good causes (often via lotteries, and often involving
the state), and self-organized mutual aid gambling (where players and organisers are often the same people), and
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sociological research on play: gambling has diverse political-economic meanings, and is not
just about individuals winning money.16 Gambling can involve the celebration of individual
risk-taking, in commercial environments, but it can also involve communal play;17 raising
money for charity,18 escaping daily worries, sociality and group bonding;19 showing love to
family;20 sharing resources within the community;21 cementing national and imperial ties,22 or
securing survival in informal economies.23
However, according to many scholars these dimensions of play are being squeezed out
by the global spread of US-style casino resorts, in a corporate steamrollering of gambling
forms.24 Associated with Big Gambling corporations, and governments eager to attract
revenues and jobs,25 such resorts typically offer a standardized gambling experience, in which
electronic gambling machines play a key role. For example Natasha Dow Schüll has researched
the processes involved in corporate efforts to increase the use of gambling machines in Macao’s
casinos, reducing labour costs and risks to the house associated with table games.26 In a similar
vein, Gerda Reith has examined the way that electronically mediated forms of play have fueled
the growth of a highly efficient extractive gambling industry, with standardized digital products
on offer almost everywhere.27 Machines have spread “like kudzu” (an invasive weed) in
casinos around the world,28 taking over space that was previously devoted to table games; they
are increasingly prevalent in other gambling environments as well, such as Australian hotels

the gradual erasure of the latter in benefit of the former, see Kate Bedford, Bingo Capitalism: Regulating Gambling
and Political Economy in Everyday Life (manuscript under review).
16
See inter alia, Cosgrave, supra note 4; Rebecca Cassidy, “Horse versus machine: battles in the betting shop”
(2012) 18:2 J R Anthropol Inst 266, 280; Per Binde, “Gambling, Exchange Systems, and Moralities” (2005) 21:4
J Gambl Stud 445; Rebecca Cassidy, Andrea Pisac and Claire Loussouarn, eds, Qualitative Research in Gambling:
Exploring the Production and Consumption of Risk (London: Routledge 2013).
17
See e.g. Cassidy, ibid, on sharing winnings and communal play among bettors and machine players.
18
Robert K Christensen et al, “Light and Dark Sides of Nonprofit Activities and the Rules to Manage Them: The
Case of Charitable Bingo” (2009) 41:2 Administration and Society 213.
19
Irving Kenneth Zola, “Observations on gambling in a lower-class setting” in Cosgrave, supra note 5 at 152;
Cassidy, Pisac & Loussouarn, eds, supra note 16 at 87; Binde, supra note 16; Stine Simonsen Puri, “Relationships
of Chance: Friendships in a Gambling Setting of Urban India” (2016) 39:1 South Asia Journal of South Asian
Studies 109.
20
Emma Casey, “Working class women, gambling and the dream of happiness” (2008) 89 Feminist Review 122.
21
Yale D Belanger, ed, First Nations Gaming in Canada (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2011)
especially Yale Belanger, “Towards an Innovative Understanding of North American Indigenous Gaming in
Historical Perspective” at 10 and Sharon Yanicki et al, “Gambling Behaviours Among Aboriginal Peoples:
Indigenous and Critical Socio-Ecological Perspectives” at 195.
22
Rebecca Cassidy, The Sport of Kings: Kinship, Class and Thoroughbred Breeding in Newmarket (Cambridge ;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
23
Amy Chazkel, Laws of Chance: Brazil’s Clandestine Lottery and the Making of Urban Public Life (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press Books, 2011); LaShawn Harris, Sex Workers, Psychics, and Numbers Runners: Black
Women in New York City’s Underground Economy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2016).
24
See e.g. Cosgrave, supra note 5; Sytze Kingma, ed, Global gambling: cultural perspectives on gambling
organizations, Routledge advances in criminology 8 (New York: Routledge, 2010); Pauliina Raento & David G
Schwartz, eds, Gambling, space, and time: shifting boundaries and cultures (Reno: University of Nevada Press,
2011).
25
Francis Markham & Martin Young, “‘Big Gambling’: The rise of the global industry-state gambling complex”
(2015) 23:1 Addiction Research and Theory 1.
26
Natasha Dow Schüll, Turning the Tables: the global gambling industry’s crusade to sell slots in Macau in
Cassidy, Pisac, & Loussouarn, supra note 16 at 92.
27
Reith, supra note 3 at 732.
28
Natasha Dow Schüll, supra note 9 at 6.
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and clubs,29 and UK betting shops.30 Their proliferation is part of a shift in gambling practices
from local to global conditions, with Sytze Kingma arguing that diverse gambling forms are
being “Las Vegasized,” or commodified into standard packages that extract profit in
predictable — often automated — forms.31 In such ways, the dominance of standardized
gambling products and environments has been linked to the growing homogenization of play
and the erosion of localized gambling cultures.
In my view, the legal and regulatory mechanisms involved in these processes of
standardization and homogenization need more critical interrogation. Some scholars have
pointed to a global trend towards gambling liberalization, and a loosening of restrictions on
electronic gambling machines,32 but they tend to view law as a straightforward instrument with
which to achieve economic ends. Hence while law is seen to facilitate the expansion of mass
commercial gambling, especially in machine form, it is not a focus on its own right. Conversely
others point to ongoing divergence in national, and sub-national, legal approaches.33 Moreover,
while several gambling law scholars have explained the political context to legal changes
around gambling,34 there is a lack of research into how law and regulation touch down, or are
resisted, in practice. People and their experiences usually appear only fleetingly, as individuals
bringing cases that are analyzed for their broader principles. People’s engagements with law
outside of courtrooms receive almost no attention.
By instead applying a socio-legal sensibility to bingo, I seek to move beyond these
limits. As socio-legal scholars have long argued, we must look beyond courts and parliaments
as sites of law making, to examine how law is invoked, ignored, strategically evaded, or
resisted, in everyday realms.35 As Alan Hyde explained, after having researched how the body
was discursively framed in case law, he was left with a key question about the relationship of
courtroom texts to actual people: “Where are all the physical bodies among all these discursive
bodies?...What do we know about the appearance, posture, deportment of bodies as subjects
and objects of legal regulation.”36 A key priority is to explore what Mariana Valverde has

Charles Livingstone, “The social economy of poker machine Gambling in Victoria” (2001) 1:1 International
Gambling Studies 46; Martin Young, “Towards a Critical Geography of Gambling Spaces: The Australian
Experience” (2011) 4:3 Human Geography 33; Nicoll, supra note 6.
30
Cassidy, supra note 16 at 279.
31
See Sytze Kingma (2010) Global Gambling: Cultural Perspectives on Gambling; see also Cassidy, Pisac, &
Loussouarn eds supra note 16.
32
Charles Livingstone & Richard Woolley, “Risky Business: A Few Provocations on the Regulation of Electronic
Gaming Machines” (2007) International Gambling Studies 361; Zhang, supra note 4.
33
E.g. Chazkel, supra note 23; Cyrille J C F Fijnaut & Alan Littler, eds, The Regulation of Gambling: European
and National Perspectives (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Toni Williams, “All about that Place: The rise and demise of
bingo liberalisation in Brazil” (2018) 30 Journal of Law and Social Policy 151; Littler and Järvinen-Tassopoulos,
supra note 6.
34
David Miers, Regulating Commercial Gambling: Past, Present, and Future (Oxford ; New York: OUP Oxford,
2004); Donald Bourgeois, The Law of Charitable and Not-for- Profit Organizations, 3d ed (Butterworths, 2002).
35
Sally Engle Merry, “Everyday Understandings of the Law in Working-Class America” (1986) 13:2 American
Ethnology 253; D Cooper, “Institutional illegality and disobedience: Local government narratives” (1996) 16:2
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 255; Dermot Feenan, ed, Exploring the “Socio” of Socio-Legal Studies
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Patricia Ewick & Susan S Silbey, The Common Place of Law:
Stories from Everyday Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Nicholas Blomley, Rights of Passage:
Sidewalks and the Regulation of Public Flow (Routledge, 2011); Michael McCann & Tracey March, “Law and
everyday forms of resistance: A socio-political assessment.” (1996) 15 Studies in Law, Politics and Society 207.
36
Alan Hyde, Bodies of Law (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997) at ix. See also Shelley Day Sclater,
Introduction, in Andrew Bainham, Shelley Day Sclater & Martin Richards, eds, Body Lore and Laws: Essays on
29
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termed “lowly legal mechanisms”37, or “everyday legal governance.”38 Rather than ‘big law’
networks that use the language of constitutional challenges and abstract absolute rights,39 her
work has focused instead on pub and taxi licensing practices;40 permits, park regulations; “lowkey protocols” impacting city employees;41 and food cart rules.42 Through such work, she and
others have charted the way in which legal mechanisms “come to exercise a certain
unquantifiable constitutive power”43, normalizing certain modes of life while contributing to
the disappearance of others.
Bingo provides an excellent opportunity for a similarly-framed socio-legal inquiry into
gambling regulation. Unlike resort casinos, bingo has a range of vernacular meanings.
Although these vary by country,44 in Canada bingo is partly about commercial entertainment,
partly about donation to good causes, and partly about self-organized mutual aid. Unlike large
scale lotteries, typically requiring significant state involvement and extensive collaboration
with businesses, in bingo charities themselves have often retained a key role in operating the
gaming. In Canada, organizations licensed to conduct and manage bingo games orchestrate –
either directly or through donating to other organizations - a range of ‘good works,’ from rape
crisis shelters to immigrant support groups, from right to life campaigns to youth sports and
recreation organizations.45 They are typically required to use their own volunteers to run the
gambling.46 Because it mixes self-organized civic activity, good works, and play in these ways,
bingo is a key prism through which to explore the entanglement between different meanings
of gambling, and how they are shaped by regulation.
Specifically, in this article I focus on how players and paid workers are regulated in
provincially-licensed, land-based (as opposed to online) bingo in Canada. I focus especially,
although not exclusively, on bingo halls in BC and Ontario that have moved from charitable to
provincial control.47 I ask: what is happening to bingo and its distinctive player demographic
as governments increasingly promote casino forms of play? What can that teach us about the
impact of regulation on diverse gambling cultures? Are casino forms and electronic gaming
machines, and the individualistic, corporatized form of play that they represent, inevitably
winning out, or are other gambling realities being sustained or re-invented in the socio-legal
shadows? In posing these questions, I seek to learn more about how people are interacting with
gambling law, in lowly realms rather than the spaces of big law.
Having briefly set out the methodology used (Part II), and the broader gambling law
and policy context within which bingo regulation in Canada occurs (Part III), I move on to
Law and the Human Body (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2002) 1 at 8, and Anne Bottomley, “The Many Appearances
of the Body in Feminist Scholarship” in Bainham, Sclater & Richards, ibid, 127 at 147.
37
Mariana Valverde, “Seeing Like a City: The Dialectic of Modern and Premodern Ways of Seeing in Urban
Governance” (2011) 45 Law and Society Review 277 at 297.
38
Mariana Valverde, “Taking land use seriously: toward an ontology of municipal law” (2005) 9 Law Text Culture
34 at 55.
39
Ibid at 40.
40
Mariana Valverde, “The Ethic of Diversity: Local Law and the Negotiation of Urban Norms” (2008) 33:4 Law
& Social Inquiry 895; Mariana Valverde, “Police science, British style: pub licensing and knowledges of urban
disorder” (2003) 32:2 Economy and Society 234.
41
Valverde supra note 38 at 48.
42
Ibid; see also Blomley, supra note 34.
43
Mariana Valverde, “Laws of the Street” (2009) 21:2 City Soc 163 at 164.
44
See Bedford et al., The Bingo Project, supra note 1.
45
Kate Bedford, “Regulating Volunteers: Lessons from the Bingo Halls” (2015) 40:2 Law and Social Inquiry 461.
46
Ibid.
47
I have considered the regulation of volunteers, including via dress codes, in ibid.
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describe the distinctive, and in many respects resistant, nature of Canadian bingo halls (Part
IV). I then consider two key examples of recent regulatory changes in bingo: smoking bans
(Part V) and the touching of cash (Part VI). I argue that smoking bans have harmed players’
ability to cantankerously occupy the bingo hall space in two ways. Firstly, as smoking bans
have spread to outdoor spaces around bingo halls, they become less about protecting the health
of non-smokers and more about exiling smokers from public space, in part because they are
seen to set a bad example. Secondly, the drop in business caused by provincial smoking bans
has led to key changes in how bingo is played, in the side games run alongside it, and in the
regulatory approach to bingo. Automated gambling forms have proliferated in halls as a result.
Due to the intertwining of these two effects of smoking bans, notoriously stubborn bingo
regulars, who appear to act like they own the place, are being replaced by machines, and the
slots players who are drawn to them.
In the final example in the article, I explore how requirements to show ‘clean hands’
after touching cash have been received by workers and players. These rules were cut and paste
from casinos into bingo halls. They reshape the familiar, close nature of connection between
players and employees characteristic of bingo environments in Canada, and they are highly
contentious. They distance players from staff, by professionalizing contact and increasing
surveillance of touch. They also violate norms of trust that are fundamental to players’ sense
of belonging, and to many employees’ enjoyment of the work. Hence I examine how these new
casino-based rules have been resisted and mocked, sharing stories intended to register a bingobased defiance.
In closing, I consider the lessons that the Canadian case study of bingo might hold for
those interested in broader debates about gambling and law. I suggest that the regulatory
mechanisms through which diverse gambling forms are being standardized, or Las Vegasized,
need socio-legal interrogation. More precisely, I argue that regulations play a key role in
restructuring gambling environments in more automated, standardized directions, where the
diverse meanings of gambling are narrowed. Mutual aid practices and trust are decentered,
player senses of ownership are interrupted, and the efficient extraction of profit is maximized.
However, mine is not a straightforward story of the corporate trampling of non-casino
gambling vernaculars. Looking to practices, we see that heterogeneous gambling cultures are
being (re)made against the rules, if only on a small scale, non-spectacular basis.

II. METHODOLOGY
The multi-method approach used in the larger grant project, of which this article is a part,
reflects a commitment to socio-legal research, wherein law is traced in its everyday
manifestations rather than only as it appears in court cases, or legislative debates. The team
researched four case studies of bingo regulation, in England and Wales, Canada, Brazil, and
online in the European Union.48 We used a multi-method qualitative approach including
See Donal Casey, “Risk, Charity and Boundary Disputes: The Liberalisation and Commercialisation of Online
Bingo in the European Union” (2018) 30 Journal of Law and Social Policy 27; Williams, supra note 33. See also
Bedford et al., supra note 1; Bedford, supra note 45; Kate Bedford, “Letting the Right Ones In: Whitelists,
Jurisdictional Reputation, and the Racial Dynamics of Online Gambling Regulation” (2015) 34:1 Environment
and Planning D: Society and Space 30; Kate Bedford, “Bingo Regulation and the Feminist Political Economy of
Everyday Gambling” (2016) 13:6 Globalizations 801; Donal Casey, “The DNA of Bingo: Charity and Online
Bingo” in Michael Egerer, Virve Marionneau & Janne Nikkinen eds Gambling Policies in European Welfare
States: Current Challenges and Future Prospects (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2018 forthcoming); Maria Luiza
48
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interviews with two hundred and fifty-five regulatory stakeholders around the world, field
notes from participant observation in legal bingo games, and analysis of case law, legislation,
codes of practice and charity/company level rules. We interviewed a wide range of individuals
involved in bingo, such as operators (commercial and non-commercial), regulators (at many
levels, from the municipal to the supra-national), politicians, specialist lawyers, judges,
employees, volunteers, software designers, and bingo equipment manufacturers. Interviews
were semi-structured, so they ran more like a guided conversation than a survey. Notes or a
full transcript of the interview (whichever the interviewee preferred) were sent back to the
interviewee in case they wished to make changes. Once a final version had been agreed upon,
an anonymised version was created for analysis. All data was uploaded to NVIVO (a qualitative
data research tool), and coded manually for key themes and patterns. Coding collaboratively,
with the data held on a server, we aimed to generate codes inductively for each case study.
Towards the end of the research we were also able to compare the key themes across the case
studies. In total we created codes for thirty-seven analytic themes (many with sub-themes).
For the Canadian case study, I analyzed relevant law, policy, and guidance (e.g.
gambling legislation, licensing regulations at provincial, municipal, and First Nations levels;
codes of practice; guidelines; information bulletins from regulators); annual reports from
provincial gambling operators and regulators; and data on licensees and use of proceeds. I have
records of official federal and provincial political debate on bingo (stretching back to 1938),
and I collected and reviewed two hundred and seventy-one cases involving bingo. These ranged
from high level cases involving constitutional debates at the Supreme Court of Canada, to
divorce cases, labour disputes, and civil lawsuits over how to divide up bingo winnings.
In addition, in 2011 I conducted twenty-eight interviews (twenty-six recorded and
transcribed) in Ontario with a mix of provincial government policy makers, bingo inspectors,
suppliers, hall managers, volunteer coordinators, volunteers, presidents of charitable bingo hall
associations, and bingo industry representatives. I repeated the study in Alberta in 2012,
conducting twenty-seven interviews (twenty-three recorded and transcribed) with the same mix
of stakeholders. In 2014 and 2015 I conducted a further fifty-nine interviews with seventy-five
people involved in bingo in Ontario and British Columbia. Since I started research into
Canadian bingo regulation in 2011, I have also travelled across several provinces to visit bingo
facilities, ranging from large halls in major cities with life-changing jackpots on offer, to tiny
pub bingos in rural communities where the top prize was a packet of chicken thighs.

III. THE LAW AND POLICY FRAMEWORK.
The federal legal framework for Canadian gambling is set out in part VII of the Criminal Code49
a part otherwise preoccupied with prostitution, bawdy houses, and acts of indecency. This
criminalizes those found gambling and betting, alongside those who offer gambling, promote

Kurban Jobim & Toni Williams, “Análise crítica à luz dos pilares da legislação consumerista e do "the bingo
project" (2016) 103 Revista do Direito do Consumidor 359-379; Maria Luiza Kurban Jobim & Toni Williams,
“Chance Developments: Bingo Regulation in Brazil,” (2017) 35: Revista Análise Econômica; online:
<http://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/AnaliseEconomica/article/view/70305> [https://perma.cc/EG8W-XA2N]; Maria
Luiza Kurban Jobim & Toni Williams, "Bingos no Brasil: fardo ou legado? Reflexões críticas e contribuições
para a regulação dos jogos na atualidade” in Luiz Carlos Prestes Filho, ed A Teoria das Probabilidades no Jogo,
na Ciência e nas Políticas Públicas (Rio de Janeiro, E-Papers, 2017) 85.
49
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C - 46. (hereinafter CC).
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or advertise gambling, or supply gambling devices (s. 206).50 However, under s. 207(1)(a), it
is lawful:
for the government of a province, either alone or in conjunction
with the government of another province, to conduct and manage
a lottery scheme in that province, or in that and the other
province, in accordance with any law enacted by the legislature
of that province.
also, according to s. 207(1)(b):
for a charitable or religious organization, pursuant to a
licence…to conduct and manage a lottery scheme in that
province if the proceeds from the lottery scheme are used for a
charitable or religious object or purpose.
Private sector businesses, known as gaming service providers, can only assist the provincial
governments and charities allowed to conduct and manage legal games; the latter groups must
retain the overall responsibility and control of the gaming. In an important further limitation
on charitable gambling activity, s. 207 (4) (c) of the Criminal Code reserves to provinces the
authority to run a lottery game “operated on or through a computer, video device or slot
machine.”51 Hence charities are prohibited from conducting and managing games of chance
that are computer-reliant (such as electronic bingo): such games have to be run by the province,
under s.207 (1) (a) powers.
Typically, Crown corporations operate gaming facilities under s207(1)(a) powers,
having been granted a monopoly by the province over casinos, race tracks, and lotteries. In so
doing they generate significant provincial revenues. The British Columbia Lottery Corporation
(BCLC) has raised over $20 billion for the province since 1985.5253 In 2016-7 it generated over
$1.3 billion in net income, $96 million over budget.54 The Ontario Lottery and Gaming
Corporation (OLG) has generated $44 billion since 1975.55 In 2015-6 the OLG made $2.2
billion in net profit,56 making gambling the greatest source of non-tax revenue for the province.
I lack the space to detail how provinces have applied this law and policy framework to
bingo. For the purposes of this article, suffice it to say that the general trend has been towards
57

50

Bourgeois, supra note 34.
CC, s. 207 (4) (c).
52
British Columbia Lottery Corporation [BCLC], Social Responsibility Report (2016) at 7, online
<http://corporate.bclc.com/content/dam/bclc/corporate/documents/corporate-reports/bclc-2016-2017-socialresponsibility-report.pdf> [perma.cc/2UUC-3Q8E].
53
All dollar amounts in this article refer to Canadian dollars.
54
BCLC, 2016/7 Annual Service Plan Report, (2016) at 5, online <
http://corporate.bclc.com/content/dam/bclc/corporate/documents/corporate-reports/bclc-2016-2017-annualreport.pdf> [perma.cc/YZ2S-V7YS].
55
OLG, Annual Report 2015-6, (2016) at 4 online <http://about.olg.ca/wpcontent/uploads/sites/28/2017/03/OLG-AnnualReport1516_EN.pdf> [perma.cc/3ZEX-E2BC].
56
Ibid at 3.
57
et al see, inter alia, Bedford et al., supra note 1.; Kate Bedford, “Regulating Volunteers: Lessons from the Bingo
Halls” (2015) 40:2 Law and Social Inquiry 461; Colin S Campbell & Garry J Smith, “Canadian Gambling: Trends
and Public Policy Issues” (1998) 556 Gambling: Socioeconomic Impacts and Public Policy Annals of the
American Academy of Political Science 22; Colin S Campbell, Timothy F Hartnagel & Garry J Smith, The
51
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greater provincial involvement in bingos outside of First Nations territories. When bingo
boomed, nation-wide, in the 1980s, charities conducted and managed games under s207 (1) (b)
provisions, in alliance with businesses. However as attendance declined through the 1990s and
2000s (in part because of competition from expanded provincial gambling activities run under
s207 (1) (a) provisions, in casinos and race tracks that allowed slots), Crown corporations
became more involved in bingo. In BC charities fought a losing legal battle to retain their
independent role in conducting and managing bingo in full time, charity-association run halls,
and in 2004 those halls were taken over by the Crown corporation.58 Under s. 207 (1) (a)
authority, many were re-positioned as community gaming centres (CGCs) which offer slot
machines alongside bingo and are run by the BCLC in partnership with private businesses.
Ontario used a somewhat more negotiated approach. In 2005 the Alcohol and Gaming
Commission of Ontario (AGCO) launched a Modernization of Charitable Gaming initiative,
aiming to modernize regulation to protect charitable revenues and “to reflect the [bingo]
industry’s changing needs in the 21st century.”59 It piloted electronic bingo in Barrie, Kingston,
Peterborough, Sudbury, Toronto, and Windsor. In order that the province stay in compliance
with the Criminal Code (which reserves to provinces the authority to run games requiring a
computer, under s.207 (4) (c)), the Ontario Lottery and Gaming corporation — the operational
enterprise agency set up to operate gaming services on behalf of the province — thereby
assumed responsibility for conducting and managing gambling in the e-bingo sites, taking over
from the charities that had operated bingo under s.207 (1) (b) licenses. The pilot was given the
ministerial green light for a province-wide rollout, which started in 2012. Of the sixty-one
bingo halls remaining in Ontario, thirty are operated by associations of charities, and are
regulated by the AGCO; the rest are operated by the OLG, on behalf of the province. The thirtyone under OLG control were rebranded as ‘c-gaming’ locations (with the ‘c’ designating that
they were charitable and community forms of gaming), in part because of marketing research
that suggested the word bingo was off-putting, being associated with the old, the poor, the
Indigenous, and the decidedly non-glamourous.60
It is important to underscore that greater provincial involvement in bingo in Ontario
and BC has not lead to a revenue boom. From 2011-15, bingo revenue in BC declined on
average 13 per cent per year.61 In 2015-6, when BCLC achieved its highest net income for the
province to date, slot machines brought in $1.2 billion in revenue, table games $516 million,
and bingo just $71 million.62 In 2015-6, OLG made $166 million in total revenue from its cgaming operations, but after prizes, expenses, and payments to charities it posted a net loss of
$35 million.63 Hall numbers and attendances have also fallen significantly: in Ontario there are
Legalization of Gambling in Canada in Law Commission of Canada, ed, What is a Crime: Defining Criminal
Conduct in Contemporary Society (Vancouver: UBC Press 2005); Bourgeois, supra note 34.
58
See Bingo City Games Inc. et al v B.C. Lottery Corp. et al, 2005 BCSC 25 (CanLII) and Nanaimo Community
Bingo Association v Attorney General of British Columbia, 1998 BCSC 1192 and discussion in Colin S
Campbell, Non-profits and gambling expansion: the British Columbia experience. Gambling in Canada
research Report no. 9 (Calgary: Canada West Foundation, 2000) at 9, online
https://prism.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/handle/1880/315/Non_Profits_and_Gambling_Expansion.pdf
[perma.cc/G2QH-EQGF]
59
Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario [AGCO], AGCO Bingo Revenue Model for Pooling Bingo Halls:
One Year Review Results (Toronto: AGCO 2009) at 1.
60
Ontario Bingo Development Fund, Market Research Toolkit. (Ontario, March 2010) online
<https://cgao.ca/docs/2011/OBDF-Market-Research-Tool-Kit.pdf> [perma.cc/FQR9-ZYHX].
61
Bedford et al, supra note 1 at 26.
62
BCLC, Annual Service Plan Report 2014-15, supra note 54 at 28.
63
OLG, Annual Report 2015-6, supra note 55 at 32.
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now sixty-one bingo halls, down from two hundred and thirty in 2000. However money is being
made from expanded electronic products available in bingo facilities, including slots in BC and
play-on-demand and electronic break open ticket dispensers introduced in Ontario in the last
few years.64
Although there is much to be said about the implications of these changes for our
understanding of the law, policy, and political economy of gambling, in Canada and beyond,65
the aim in the rest of the article is to move past the squabbles between charities, businesses,
and provinces over how to divide up bingo revenue, to instead consider how workers and
players are affected by shifting landscapes of provincial bingo regulation. To do that I focus on
the rules in bingo facilities that are being subjected to greater provincial oversight, to see how
they ‘land’, how they are being resisted or evaded, and what that might tell us about the role of
law and regulation in restructuring gambling environments.

IV. BINGO AND NON-COMPLIANCE
You’ve got people fighting over chairs. It’s four o'clock and it’s
just opened and ‘That bitch is in my chair!’. There is 200 empty
chairs. ‘Take another one.’ ‘No I want mine!’ I’ve seen fist
fights. Little old ladies. They are zealots (laughs).
(male volunteer organizer of an independent charity bingo, BC).
Bingo is a distinctive game, and bingo halls are distinctive gambling environments. This
distinctiveness stems from several sources, including the player demographics, and the game’s
relationship to self-organized mutual aid (where organizations retain control over distribution
of proceeds, and run games themselves, through finding and managing volunteers). Because of
their more bottom-up origins, bingo halls are not standardized. Halls play different game
variants, for example, and efforts to link venues (and hence scale up prizes) within provinces
are frequently hampered because of local variations. Halls may refuse to alter their schedules
so as to accommodate a linked game, because it interrupts their established rhythm of play.
Another key dimension of bingo’s distinctiveness concerns staff. Many of the people
managing bingo halls in Canada started out as players, and/or as volunteers for games intended
to benefit organizations of which they were a part. They thus learned the sector from the ground
up. From the perspective of those working in other gambling sectors, these managers are
sometimes seen as amateurish, as “housewives” (male, gambling industry executive, Alberta);
it would, they feel, be better to pass control to gaming entrepreneurs and “business guys” who
could better maximise revenue streams. However, the housewives have, stubbornly, stayed put.
Moreover, historically they have been subjected to less regulatory oversight than people
working in other gambling sectors. For example, while financial disclosure and due diligence
rules were imposed on casino managers in Alberta from the start, they were proposed for bingo
Kevin Harrigan, Dan Brown & Vance MacLaren, “Gamble While You Gamble: Electronic Games in Ontario
Charitable Gaming Centres” (2015) 13:6 International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction 740 [Harrigan,
Brown & MacLaren, “Gamble While You Gamble”]; Vance V MacLaren, Kevin A Harrigan & Michael J Dixon,
“An Introduction to Video Instant Ticket Vending Machines” (2015) 30 Journal of Gambling Issues 22
[MacLaren, Harrigan & Dixon, “Introduction”].
65
E.g. Indiana had its own version of the B.C. bingo showdown in 2003, involving charity legal action against
the state’s new bingo revenue model; see Paarlberg et al, supra note 10 at 231. Alabama’s bingo wars, which
dominated the 2010 governor’s race, involved police clampdowns on electronic bingo in some of the poorest
counties in the state, see White, Brown & Dowd, supra note 10.
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staff in the early 2000s. Seeing questions about their mortgages, family sources of income and
so on as an egregious violation of their privacy, bingo managers revolted, refusing en masse to
fill in the forms. As one bingo hall manager explained:
Respondent: The big crux of what we had to face with AGLC
(the Alberta Gaming and Liquor Commission) is they were
putting due diligence onto bingo hall managers. And I don’t
know if you've ever seen the due diligence that casinos have been
accepting, they all have to be idiots to accept this kind of...
Where AGLC gets off thinking that they can invade the privacy
of people the way that they do is beyond me.
Kate: So you mean their personal finances-Respondent: Oh yeah.
Kate: --for bingo managers?
Respondent: And not just your personal; they want to know
tenth generation great grandfather, great grandmother, who was
married to who and they figure they have the right to delve into
all of this. I have been personally divorced for (x) years. I would
have to divulge my ex’s finances…Do you think for one minute
he would allow any of his information...? There’s no way. I said
to my (charity) association, I will resign. There's no way in hell’s
half acre I will fill out. None of their business. They want
anything on me, that's fine. My kids, my ex, my sister, my
brother, its got nothing to do with them. Like, where is that
affiliated to my job?.... We fought for months, we pounded the
pavement, we went to MLAs, we went to heads of government.
(female, Alberta, 2011)
The provincial regulator eventually backed down.
Staff also tend to have a close bond with players, not least because some bingo players
are intensely attached to the game, and to their local hall. Workers express genuine care and
fondness for these ‘regulars,’ addressing them by name, and even calling to check up on them
when they do not come in. Indeed, I have been repeatedly told (by staff and customers) that
when bingo halls close some of the most dedicated regular players die, their main social outlet
gone. It is hard to imagine a more powerful assertion of the social value of the game.
Lest this account appear overly earnest, I should emphasise that there is also an element
of teasing and banter between workers and players in Canadian bingo halls. Apparent insults
and scowls are exchanged which look nothing like corporate models of good customer service,
with its emphasis on polite smiling, but which create a sense of closeness and welcome familiar
in more working-class milieu. Moreover, the banter is sometimes flirtatious or saucy, especially
between male callers and female players, and halls have long cultivated this dimension of play.
The pull-tab based side games introduced to run alongside main stage bingo are called ‘balls
tickets,’ allowing endless opportunities for ribald jokes about hot, great, and steaming balls.
Halls have organized popular dirty bingo nights for years (involving a mix of drag queen
callers, sex toy prizes, and risqué jokes). One Ontario hall manager recalled working with the
guest callers to ensure that the jokes were “naughty and fun without being offensive and
obscene.” This event was popular with regular customers, including “old ladies who giggled
though the whole thing” (female, hall manager, Ontario). Interestingly, under provincial control
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the banter (and the sex toy prizes) have had to be significantly toned down. The OLG had been
perturbed by a ‘best orgasm’ contest in one hall, for example, and another had shifted to giving
gift certificates to a local adult store as prizes rather than vibrators, due to concern that the
provincial brand would be harmed if the latter were on display during a game. As one manager
put it, the OLG “are a little bit prudish…”. But the point remains that bingo halls — even those
subjected to increasing provincial oversight — are distinctive environments, offering players
and workers a unique social space.
A further feature of this distinctiveness is that regular players exert a quite remarkable
degree of control over bingo halls. With a declining player base, and struggling to stay open,
keeping the regulars happy is a key concern for many halls. Hence halls will tolerate significant
non-compliance with official rules. In particular, in a landmark article on everyday resistance
based on 430 interviews with people about how they experience, interpret, and use law, Patricia
Ewick and Susan Silbey highlighted the importance of “foot-dragging, taking time, colonizing
space, camping out”.66 They argued that violating norms about the length of time that people
are present in particular places can be a way to disrupt power.67 Bingo players know this very
well. They sometimes arrive several hours before a game starts (sometimes before the hall
officially opens, banging on the door until a cleaner lets them in), going to their regular table,
stretching out their paper, or book, or knitting to claim it. They may bring in flasks of drink,
sweets or snacks, and even full meals, eating them next to signs forbidding the consumption of
food from outside. Fist fights have been had over favourite chairs, considered lucky by their
wannabe occupants, although more often staff will simply reserve the best tables and chairs for
regulars. During a renovation, one hall manager gave players control over the selection of new
chairs, bringing in options for them to try out. Indeed, the sense from staff in Canadian bingo
halls is that players think they own the place. Facility managers wisely avoid contesting this
sense of ownership.
In turn regular players are usually the ones who enforce rules about noise, by
‘sshushing’ people (especially new players and young people, but sometimes staff and
volunteers) who talk so as to make it hard to hear the caller, or (as commonly) so as to disturb
a space that regulars think of as theirs. Being quiet is hence about deferring to those who own
the place (and who will not be sshushed if they talk) as much as it is about hearing the caller
clearly. Sometimes a side room or area, where additional noise is allowed, is carved out by a
group of regulars. In one hall this was referred to as the ‘Native’s room,’ a reflection of the fact
that race and indigeneity inflect everyday contestation over noise (and by default ownership)
in bingo halls.
Indigenous players seemed disproportionately likely to be ‘sshushed’ by nonIndigenous players in provincially-licensed bingos, and in turn more likely to voice counterobjections that the bingo hall is a space for socializing, not just winning money. Sometimes a
tipping point is reached such that the preferences of the noisy override those of the quiet. In
one busy game I attended in a major city in BC, with a large roll-over prize on offer, players
were rowdy throughout, banging their dabbers on the wooden tables when the caller made an
error and shouting at him to slow down or speak up. There was a lot of chatting, laughing, and
noisy food consumption during the play. A few times people shushed and at one point, when it
was quite loud, the white male caller said “please be quiet during the game”. A woman in a
Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, “Narrating Social Structure: Stories of Resistance to Legal Authority” (2003)
108:6 American Journal of Sociology 1328. See also McCann & March, supra note 35.
67
Ibid at 1362.
66
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motorized scooter with a large ‘free range Indian’ sticker pasted on the back and ‘STOP
HARPER’ in a stop sign sticker on the front yelled back “no!.” People laughed and the noise
went on as before.68
I use these examples to highlight a key feature of bingo: that it is in many respects a
realm of the rowdy, non-compliant, and cantankerous. Originating, in part, in self-organized
mutual aid, it was subjected to looser oversight than provincially controlled gaming. Staff are
not used to standardized corporate procedures, and sometimes resist them. Moreover, players
have a distinctive sense of ownership of halls, frequently talking back to callers, spreading out
to control the space, and staying far longer than they are officially supposed to. Given these
features, what happens when new provincial regulations — often designed with other sectors
in mind — are rolled out into bingo?

V. HUSSIES, SMOKING BANS, AND SLOT MACHINES
We fought tooth and nail against that smoking by-law,
absolutely…We figured it was gonna be the end of gaming (in
the area).
(female, hall manger, Ontario).
Games like electronic bingo, Play on Demand games and TapTix
allow the 31 Charitable Gaming Centres to offer more customer
choice and to appeal to a broader demographic while providing
a different gaming entertainment experience from traditional
bingo.69
A key, and crucial, exception to the generally limited regulation of bingo environments
concerns smoking. Provincially licensed bingo halls are governed by anti-smoking legislation.
This gradually increased in scale during the 1990s and 2000s, moving from municipal by-laws
to provincial bans. Ontario adopted a province wide smoking ban (Bill 164) in June 2005,
enacted the following year: BC enacted one in 2008. Smoking is still permitted in some onreserve bingos, and it is an important dimension of on-going debates about Indigenous
sovereignty and pollution.70 But otherwise the bingo environments encountered during field
work in Canada were smoke-free.

Author’s fieldwork notes.
OLG, Annual report 2015-6, supra note 63 at 7 (in a section on the Charitable Gaming Revitalization Initiative).
70
See Bottorff et al, supra note 14. I address the regulation of smoking in First Nations run bingos elsewhere, in
a broader context whereby the ‘entrepreneurship’ of First Nations governments in undercutting environmental
regulations designed to protect workers has long been championed by free market thinkers. See Robert J Miller,
Reservation “Capitalism”: Economic Development in Indian Country (Lincoln: Bison Books, 2013). On the
dumping of dangerous waste as an economic development strategy for marginalized communities see Dayna
Nadine Scott, ed, Our Chemical Selves: Gender, Toxics, and Environmental Health (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2015); Robert D Bullard, “Race and Environmental Justice in the United States” (1993) 18 Yale J Int Law 319,
Michael Mascarenhas, “Where the Waters Divide: First Nations, Tainted Water and Environmental Justice in
Canada” (2007) 12:6 Local Environment 565. For a similar argument about smoking in tribal casinos in the US
see Isaiah “Shaneequa” Brokenleg et al, “Gambling with Our Health: Smoke-Free Policy Would Not Reduce
Tribal Casino Patronage” (2014) 47:3 Am J Prev Med 290.
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As Kirsten Bell shows in her anthropological work on smoking regulation,71 most of
the copious law and policy research on smoking bans lacks the affective and visceral
dimensions.72 It has nothing to say about the disgust that non-smokers express, verbally and
viscerally, when they encounter smoke; about the way that smoke functions as an in-between
substance, ejected from one body and then unwillingly inhaled by another; about the body
politics of smoking bans.73 It also has little to say about the demographics of the people
involved. “Smokers” and “non-smokers” are imagined as the only categories of differentiation
that matter. While legislation purports to target a behaviour (smoking), a product (cigarettes),
or a pollutant (smoke), of course smoking is far more prevalent among some groups than
others.74 The oft-invoked distinction between being anti-smoking and anti-smoker is thus more
complex in practice. In Canada, smoking prevalence varies substantially between regions (from
53 per cent in Nunavut to 18 per cent in British Columbia), and according to demographic
characteristics: according to one recent summary of data "smoking prevalence was greater
among men, those with low household income, less than a high school education, and in manual
occupations. Across racial/ethnic groups in Canada, smoking was greatest among those of
Aboriginal identity (42.7 per cent)."75 Smoking rates are also higher for older people.
This meant inevitably that bingo halls — populated disproportionately by the old, the
poor, and the Indigenous (although admittedly skewed female) - would be heavily impacted by
smoking bans. One Ontario bingo hall manager had counted customers in the smoking and
non-smoking sections of his hall (based near the US border) prior to the introduction of a
municipal smoking ban, and found 78 per cent in the smoking section. Another bingo hall
manager in the east of Ontario estimated that at the time of the provincial ban 90 per cent of
Kirsten Bell, “Legislating abjection? Secondhand smoke, tobacco control policy and the public’s health” (2011)
21:1 Critical Public Health 49; Kirsten Bell, “Where There’s Smoke There’s Fire: Outdoor Smoking Bans and
Claims to Public Space” (2013) 40:1 Contemporary Drug Problems 99.
72
Legal literature on smoking bans has focused mostly on the evolving case law, and on the level at which
decisions about smoking bans should be made (tobacco lobbying is often more powerful at state level and hence
local governments were key to initiating smoking bans in the US). See e.g. Collin Schueler, “Not out There: Why
Outdoor Smoking Bans Finally Pass Constitutional Muster” (2011) 15 Quinnipiac Health Law J 127; Robert L
Rabin, “Some Thoughts on Smoking Regulation” (1990) 43 Stanford Law Review 475. Meanwhile politics
literature has focused on competing explanations for why bans have been adopted when they have. See e.g.
Valentina Mele & Amelia Compagni, “Explaining the Unexpected Success of the Smoking Ban in Italy: Political
Strategy and Transition to Practice, 2000–2005” (2010) 88:3 Public Administration 819; Lars Thorup Larsen,
“Framing knowledge and innocent victims. Europe bans smoking in public places” (2010) 7:1 Critical Discourse
Studies 1; Dimiter Toshkov, “Policy-Making Beyond Political Ideology: The Adoption of Smoking Bans in
Europe” (2013) 91:2 Public Administration 448; Donley T Studlar, “Punching Above Their Weight Through
Policy Learning: Tobacco Control Policies in Ireland” (2015) 30:1 Irish Political Studies 41. Debate is dominated
by those seeking comparative lessons for how to implement effective prohibitionist policies. If an alternative
exists it is from free-market advocates using Hayek to argue that free markets will efficiently allocate space to
those who value it most, and hereby resolve conflicts between smokers and non-smokers, not an especially
sophisticated theory of regulation: see e.g. John Meadowcroft, “Economic and Political Solutions to Social
Problems: The Case of Second-hand Smoke in Enclosed Public Places” (2011) 23:2 Review of Political Economy
233.
73
For an account of tobacco lobby groups attempting to mobilise arguments that smokers are a disadvantaged
minority, see Davina Cooper, Challenging Diversity: Rethinking Equality and the Value of Difference (Cambridge
University Press, 2004) at 60-67. Although she concludes that smoking does not constitute a form of inequality
that operates as a social principle (unlike race, or gender), she also notes that “having been turfed out of work and
leisure venues, smokers are now facing removal from the open spaces in front of buildings on the grounds that
they are unsightly – off-putting to customers and clients” at 61.
74
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his customers smoked. By 2003, local charities in Ottawa claimed to have lost $4.7 million
annually as a result of the non-smoking bylaw introduced in 2001.76 When Ontario
implemented a provincial ban in 2006, operators experienced similarly sharp drops in
attendance and profitability, resulting in a vicious circle of lower prizes, lower attendance, and
decline. A study of thirty-two bingo halls found an average reduction in profitability of 34 per
cent between 2006 and 2007, and a 25 per cent reduction in charity revenues.77 One Ontario
manager recalled that the ban “took about 45 per cent of our business away overnight” (male,
hall manager). One in BC remembered a 60 per cent drop. Anti-ban campaigns were mobilised:
a Committee to Save Charity Bingo in Ontario was formed,78 and angry letters were written to
newspapers across the country.79 However, such efforts failed.
With the benefit of hindsight most people involved in bingo recognize the health
benefits of the smoking ban for staff, volunteers, and players, and they acknowledge that the
rule has now become embedded such that players — younger ones especially (meaning under
50s in bingo) — would be put off if smoking was allowed. The bingo hall manager who had
said that 90 per cent of his customers were smokers when a ban was introduced estimated that
this had fallen to about 40 per cent a decade later. Heavy smoking also made it harder to secure
volunteers to work in halls; when asked about the challenges of mobilising people one charity
bingo organizer in BC responded that the second-hand smoke “was always the biggest issue”
(male charity bingo organiser, BC 2015). The choice between exposing workers to such an
environment, or turning away the considerable proceeds that could be made from bingo, was
an impossible one for many organizations. Two lifelong bingo insiders in Ontario recalled
bingos being run for sports clubs in smoky halls, with “kids thirteen, fourteen year old” used
to work the games:
Respondent 2: and all that smoke, when I think what that might
have done to those poor kids’ lungs, because that hall, he had
had no bigger ceilings than this (points to a low ceiling in a
domestic space)
Respondent 1: Oh God yeah
Respondent 2: It was terrible. But, we were walking out of there
and first couple of years…over the first year, people saw the
(sports) organizations going and depositing like 5 and $6,000 for
one night!
(females, bingo volunteers, Ontario).
The general consensus, then, is that the smoking ban was necessary for workers (paid
and unpaid), if exceptionally hard on profits. There are, however, two further lessons to be
learned about the experience of smoking bans in provincially-licensed bingo halls. Firstly, they
are being expanded to cover outdoor space, and in so doing moving further away from a
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rationale of protecting the health of non-smokers as ‘innocent bystanders,’80 towards neoprohibitionism aimed at banishing smokers.81 In BC, for example, when I was conducting
fieldwork in spring 2015 new smoking regulations were introduced in Vancouver Island
increasing the distance that smokers had to keep from doorways from 3m to 7m.82 Having been
moved first outside, and then away from patios and decks and awnings (which counted as an
enclosure), and then at least 3m from an entrance, smokers were to be moved further still. One
popular bingo hall in a working class district of a small city was facing the prospect of
chivvying its elderly customers away from the paved pedestrian area, where they currently
clustered to smoke, into the busy car park near a main road. The manager feared that they
would be run over. In other places, local businesses had complained that the sight of so many
poor, old people, smoking while huddling under umbrellas in snow or rain, gave the area a bad
name.
Given the lack of precision in studies of the links between outdoor smoking and harm
to non-smokers’ health,83 and the highly selective attention given to cigarettes as air pollutants
(as opposed to, for example, exhaust fumes), it seems clear that such measures are intended to
further stigmatise smoking, and to banish smokers out of distaste for their smoking, rather than
to protect the health of ‘innocent bystanders.’ As Bell notes,84 such measures work through
shame and stigma — something that bingo hall staff knew very well. As one staff member said
when explaining why she herself stopped smoking when the ban came in:
See, I smoked. Being in that smoky bingo hall meant nothing to
me. But when the by-law was coming, I had to quit smoking,
because I don’t smoke outside and never did. My mother always
told me only hussies smoked outside. So I grew up thinking that
was a bad thing to do.
(female, hall manager, Ontario).
Expanding the purview of outdoor bans is thus less about the health of non-smokers, and more
about signalling the desire to exile smokers, for their own good, because they disgust nonsmokers, and because they set a bad example. Whether or not this will work to reduce smoking
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Larsen, supra note 72.
Banishment is relative, of course, since outside smoking areas generate their own sociality (including the mix
of flirting and smoking known in the UK as ‘smirting’ (see Bell (2013) supra note 71, 105) and circuits of
use/exchange. While playing in Vancouver (BC) I had to go outside to top up parking, encountering a man out
the back by the fire doors picking up cigarette ends from the previous break to reuse.
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Non-smokers may find smoking in outdoor space unpleasant, or even disgusting, but evidence that it is a risk
to their health remains contested. A 2012 study found that “[t]he magnitude of outdoor SHS (second hand smoke)
exposure and associated health risks are relatively unknown”. See G St Helen et al, “Exposure to Secondhand
Smoke Outside of a Bar and a Restaurant and Tobacco Exposure Biomarkers in Nonsmokers.” (2012) 120:7
Environmental Health Perspectives 1010 at 1010. According to a review of over 200 papers in PubMed on SHS
and outdoor smoking, some studies have used a measure of airborne particulate matter to estimate SHS levels in
outdoor areas, but did not control for other sources of particulates “such as… traffic related air pollution”: X
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(2013), 121:7, Environmental Health Perspectives 766 at 771.
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is unclear. 85 However the success of securing the law and policy change rests in part on the
fact that smokers - more likely to be poor, Indigenous, and old — are increasingly unwelcome
in public space. Hence the visceral dimension of the smoking bans in bingo halls is crucial to
how leisure space is being reorganized.
The second lesson to draw from the smoking example is that the drop in business caused
by provincial smoking bans in off-reserve bingo halls led to key changes in how bingo was
played, in the side games run alongside it, and in regulatory approach. Bingo sessions were
redesigned to allow for more breaks, and some halls introduced rapid play options (shorter
drop-in sessions as opposed to the longer time frames that had characterized play in the past).86
Furthermore, smoking bans created incentives to automate gambling, via introducing more
slots machines in bingo environments so as to recoup profits. For example, when the first of
BC’s community gaming centres (CGCs) opened, they had smoking and non-smoking sections,
and many also had a limited number of slot machines.87 (CGCs are run by the BCLC, and are
defined in BC’s Gaming Regulations as “permanent facilities primarily for paper and electronic
bingo games and other lottery schemes, but that also include at least one slot machine” 88).
When the smoking ban was introduced, the non-smoking space was often re-purposed as a slots
area, and the number of bingo seats was reduced. One CGC went from eight hundred bingo
seats to four hundred, and the number of slots — originally fifty — gradually increased, first
to seventy-five and then, after “bingo had just been decimated” (male, facility manager, BC)
by the smoking ban, to one hundred and fifty. It now has two hundred and ninety-one slots
machines, and there are plans to add more.89 Importantly, this CGC facility is notable for its
determination to retain and promote bingo. Its owners choose to invest in new bingo equipment,
to refresh the product, and to reassure bingo players that they are still welcome in a facility that
looks, in many respects, like a machine arcade — they even installed separate entrances so that
bingo players did not have to walk in through the slots. In contrast many other CGC operators
have reduced their bingo offering to the bare minimum, installing as many slot machines as
possible. In some CGCs there is almost no bingo played at all. In one I visited, on an Easter
holiday weekend, I had to ask at reception where the bingo was because there was no signage.
The duty receptionist did not know, and had to ask a colleague. I eventually ascertained that it
was offered upstairs, auto-called in a back room a few hours a day.
Importantly, this model — of increasing the availability of automated gambling
products in response to a decline in bingo revenues caused by smoking bans - is being rolled
On the self-stigma that smokers experience, see Rebecca J Evans-Polce et al, “The Downside of Tobacco
Control? Smoking and Self-Stigma: A systematic review” (2015) 145 Soc Sci Med 26. Their study concludes that
“public health strategies which limit the stigmatization of smokers may be warranted” (at 26).
86
Sometimes games were introduced that ran alongside main stage play, rather than in the breaks, so that
additional revenue could be extracted from players while still allowing them to go outside to smoke. Key here
were ‘balls tickets’, a form of pull-tab run in connection with a main stage bingo game. They rapidly became the
survival route for halls faced with declining attendance, first in Alberta and then Ontario. An agreement to
introduce them in BC is being negotiated now. See Kate Bedford et al., supra note 1.
87
The introduction of slots into BCLC bingo facilities has caused considerable anger in some areas, leading to
legal and extra-legal local resistance. See e.g. British Columbia Lottery Corp. v Vancouver (City), 1999 BCCA
18 (whether British Columbia Lottery Corporation regulations that allowed for expanded numbers of video lottery
machines and slot machines in gaming facilities overrode a by-law passed by the Vancouver City Council
prohibiting such machines). See also Great Canadian Casino Company Ltd. v City of Surrey (1998), [1999] BCSC
2894 (CanLII) (on slots in charitable casinos).
88
Gaming Control Regulation, B.C. Reg 2008/2002, O.C. 645/202, s 2.1, Prescribed class of gaming facility.
Online: http://www.bclaws.ca/civix/document/id/lc/statreg/208_2002#section2.1 [perma.cc/XQ2X-8Z92].
89
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out elsewhere, in provinces where charities are being kept in the stakeholder mix. For example
the marketing plan for the OLG’s introduction of bingo at the Rideau Carleton facility
approvingly noted the profits that had been gained from BC’s use of slots to rejuvenate bingo
in the aftermath of a smoking ban.90 Although OLG is constrained from introducing slot
machines in its 207 (1) (a) c-gaming facilities,91 in part due to fears of provoking local
resistance to exploitative forms of gaming, it has introduced a range of other forms of electronic
gaming, including electronic break open ticket machines (or Video Instant Ticket Vending
Machines) called TapTix. These were initially developed for Native American reservations in
the US to circumvent restrictions on slot machines, but according to a recent study in Ontario
they “have also been licensed for use in veterans organizations in Maryland, veteran and
fraternal clubs in Missouri, and charitable bingo halls and clubs in New Mexico.”92 For the
player, the distinction between an electronic break open ticket dispenser and a slot machine can
be almost imperceptible, but it is essential for the operators and charities banking on machines
to rescue the bingo sector. The increase in c–gaming revenue experienced by OLG in 2015-6
was in part due to the expansion of TapTix; according to the OLG’s 2015-6 annual report
“revenue from TapTix increased by $22.2 million or 90.1 per cent.”93
In short, the smoking ban did more than reduce custom. In an attempt to revitalize the
industry operators, charities, and regulators have tried to replace a game notorious for its unruly
people and resistant use of space with the predictability of profit-extraction that comes with
machines. Already pushed outside by the smoking ban, the bingo player is now also being
squeezed out by machines introduced to rejuvenate the sector, by moving it away from bingo.
Furthermore, the symbolism of taking up time and space is changing, since the
economics of machine gaming (to induce repeat play, until money is exhausted) is the opposite
of traditional bingo (a fixed price to stay for a long period, and where play is frequently
interrupted). The conventional bingo hall space was designed so that players could comfortably
do other things than play bingo in it — knit, read, talk, spread out their food and drink, do word
puzzles etc. Slot machines are made to draw players into all-consuming interaction. As Natasha
Dow Schüll notes in her damning indictment of slot machine design, machines are purposefully
made to maximize ‘time on device’, via features such as near wins, and wins disguised as
losses, all aiming to get players into a near hypnotic ‘zone’ of automated ‘play.’94 Hence slots
players are fiercely protective of their favourite machines (often claiming them by putting
problem gambling signs on them, in a rather ironic reservation signal), and some are in the
space for so long, at least in casinos, that operators have to provide safe needle disposal bins
90
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for diabetics, and rules on what to do with customers who are falling asleep at the machine.
But such players’ behaviour is less about resistant foot-dragging, colonising space, or camping
out, and more about profit extraction. In such ways, rules intended to make bingo halls less
comfortable for smokers have made those halls more conducive to automated play.

VI. CLEAN HANDS, HARD HABITS, AND CAULIFLOWERS:
THE STAKES OF RESISTANCE TO CASH HANDLING
RULES
There is still much to expose and critique in law, but we also
have to be much more aware of the aspects of instability and
seepage.95
Resistance is enabled and collectivized, in part, by the
circulation of stories, narrating moments when taken for granted
social structure is exposed and the usual direction of constraint
upended, if only for a moment. By telling stories of resistance,
actors name and thus expose “what goes with-out saying”. By
narrating those moments when they were able to best power,
actors extend temporally and spatially individual acts of
resistance.96
The previous Part, on smoking bans, points to a growing automation of play and the narrowing
of possibilities for subversive use of the bingo hall space. In this Part, I turn to the fact that
workers are also now being subjected to far higher levels of control than in the past. In
particular, as provinces have expanded their role in bingo, they have cut and pasted rules
designed for casinos into the bingo sector. As bingo moved from charitable to provincial
control, rules that had once only impacted s.207(1)(a) gambling environments became
applicable. This has led to an intensification of concern with workers’ behaviour. Under
increased surveillance by centralised systems, required to request provincial permission for
activities that they previously ran and authorised themselves, staff are encountering a landscape
of rules that seem completely disproportionate to the risk generated by bingo. In response, they
make fun.
As many authors have noted, casino regulation typically involves very high levels of
surveillance (of players and staff), and tight prescriptive rules around authorised games and the
way in which they may be played.97 Among other things, this impacts the rules governing the
hand positions of dealers in table games. For example as summarised in a recent case in BC
detailing surveillance of casino employees:
a Dealer is required to "dust off" when handling cash [and chips]
before touching their body, which means to open their hands and
show their palms [to a camera] to demonstrate that they are not
95
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hiding money [or chips] away. When Surveillance Operators see
a Dealer who does not dust off, they first confirm the incident
[which they can do by reviewing the recorded footage], and then
they report it to their Shift Supervisor or Manager. It is then up
to the Shift Supervisor or Surveillance Manager to decide
whether the matter should be entered as an incident report in ITrak [the official centralised reporting system for casinos] or
handled in a less formal way.98
This account does not really explain the dusting off part: the act of wiping your empty palms
together after touching cash or chips, before opening your hands to an overhead camera to
prove that nothing is hidden. Dusting off started in Nevada casinos as a gaming integrity
mechanism, and it has been adopted as an industry wide global standard. It is so familiar to
casino employees that, as one BC interviewee noted, some “will go shopping and (taps hands
together, in a gesture of dusting off). [Laughs]. It’s just become so natural, right.” (male, floor
worker, BC). Jeffrey Sallaz’s ethnography of working as a blackjack dealer in Nevada and
Johannesburg also describes the requirement to show clean hands, and in his case it became so
routine that he did it when buying coffee outside of work.99
When BCLC took over BC bingos, they did so with the same regulatory objectives,
techniques, and standards used in other gambling sectors. Hence, dusting off was rolled out
into bingos. A minority of operators accepted these new rules, seeing them as helpful in
showing the legitimacy of the bingo sector to the province and the broader public. As one
explained:
We have so many regulations about how we touch cash. Right, I
mean, we can’t cup cash. It has to be very visible and it’s under
camera… From our point of view as operators, it cost us more
money, because you have got to install cameras... So systems
cost money. But at the end of the day, it also brought a
tremendous amount of credibility and peace of mind to owners
and to government in the fact that at least the cash was being
handled properly…. Any time we can have something that shows
clearly that our staff are doing proper procedures and at the end
of the day, this is a legitimate business, the stronger we all get.”
(Female, bingo manager, BC)
However, many others resisted. Although imposed in 2004, when CGCs were
introduced, in some places these rules were still causing consternation when I last visited in
2015, and the regulator was still checking regularly to see if they were being enforced. When
asked what BC’s Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch staff would be looking for when
they inspected, one bingo hall manager said:
98
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Respondent: cash handling, they’ll literally going in and view
random days on our CCTV to make sure all the staff are
following proper cash handling.
Kate: I saw you rub your hands there?
Respondent: dust off, yeah. Literally. That’s one of the things
they check. (female, hall manager, BC)
An auditor explained that some staff in bingos (and horseracing facilities) still resist complying
with cash handling rules, asking:
‘Why do we have to do it like this?’. I walked in one time for an
audit and the cashier looked at me and went like this (loud,
obvious dusting off with hands). Coz he thought, ‘I am going to
show you’ (Laughs)
(female, auditor, BC).
Another hall manager noted that although employees had now learned to comply with
dusting off, customers still tried to initiate hand-to-hand contact when using cash, and
they had to be reminded. When asked about the rules on cash handling, she explained:
Respondent: Everyone has to dust off. So you can’t do hand
to hand contact for any cash. It must be laid on the counter and
then we take it and count it out on the counter and then put it in
the till and then we have to dust off to show that we don’t have
any cash in our hands and then can hand something to the
customer. And we also have to dust off to show nothing is in our
hands when we leave the cash area as well. Same with going with
our floor sellers or prize pay outs and it’s counted out on the
counter and then they take it and count it themselves.
Kate: So the floor sellers don’t accept money to hand to hand?
Respondent:
Correct. Yes.
Kate:
Talk to me about enforcing that rule?
Respondent: It’s fairly easy now, like customers do, of course
automatically go to hand it in in our hand. It’s just like, ‘oh, if
you could just put the money on the counter, please.’ They will
say something like ‘it’s a hard habit to get into’. [Laughs]. Yes.
(female, hall manager, BC).
I did the same the first time I purchased tickets in a BC hall, trying to place money in the
cashier’s hand. He backed away, showing his empty hands to the camera above him, and told
me to put it on the counter. I felt extremely affronted. Over the subsequent weeks of fieldwork
I saw the same thing happen again and again with other customers, in other locations:
employees backed away from the player’s hands, glanced up at the camera, and told the player
to place their cash on the counter. The customer often looked affronted.
In other instances, staff shared stories of how they made fun of the rules. As Ewick and
Silbey note, passing on stories about individual acts of resistance — however small — is a
collective enterprise. The stories acquire value as they circulate, which is one reason that it is
so important for researchers to repeat stories that are told to them for these purposes. Consider,
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for example, a story from Ontario, in which bingo staff performed for the cameras, dancing
and singing when doing cash drops. Here the heavy surveillance of cash handing was an
occasion for mockery, both of the procedures and the officials tasked with remotely monitoring
cash handling compliance. As an employee explained:
I have fun with this every time I have to do it, because I just think
it’s so silly... If you’ve got money on the counter, right and if
you drop any, hands up, everybody has to back away, because
it’s cameraed [sic] and with sound. And you yell 'money on the
floor!', right. [laughs] I’m sorry, but we kill ourselves laughing,
because we are not used to that. In the beginning of bingo, we
used to like sit in an office and have money all over the desk!
Whatever, right [laughs]. And so, I mean, I know like last week,
X (name) said to me that he was starving, because he didn’t have
time to eat. So we were doing the (cash) drop and he had a veggie
tray in there he was eating, which we’re probably gonna get to
find out you weren’t supposed to do that either, because I don’t
know, you might tuck money in a piece of broccoli, I don’t know
[laughs]. But anyway, he dropped a piece of cauliflower on the
floor and he jumped off the chair and went, ‘cauliflower on the
floor !’ [laughs]. We both burst out laughing and the OLG like
they are watching!. They think we’re idiots, but I don’t care. We
are having fun with it.
(male, manager, Ontario).
He went on, immediately after telling this story, to link it to other frustrating experiences of
rules that were unnecessary or overkill – like having to fill in an incident report for a minor
being in the hall if “a lady carried her baby into buy a gift certificate, my God!” These
experiences had contributed to an environment so stressful that some staff had been signed off
work for lengthy periods. He was fully cognizant that they had to comply with such rules - but
they would do so while trying to retain a sense of humour, not caring that the OLG thought
them idiots.
Why would these new rules about touching cash and bodies (one’s own, and those of
others), cause such consternation, offence, and pointedly exaggerated performances of
compliance in bingo? In my view, the answer lies in the distinctive nature of conventional
interactions between players and staff in bingo, and the physical and emotional closeness
between them. In her research in Slovenia’s casinos, Andrea Pisac has explored how croupiers
perform complex emotional labour to bond with players, and to manage their experiences of
winning and losing.100 In turn, as I outlined in Part IV, emotional labour is much more central
to bingo than casinos. Workers express genuine care and fondness for regulars, addressing
them by name, and even calling to check up on them when they do not come in. As a result of
the familiar, close nature of connection between players and employees characteristic of bingo
environments in Canada, rules that distance players from staff by professionalizing contact,
and increasing surveillance of touch, are highly contentious, since they violate norms of trust
Andrea Pisac, “Croupiers Sleight of Mind: Playing with Unmanaged ‘Spaces’ in the Casino Industry” 59 in
Cassidy, Pisac & Loussouarn, supra note 2; Arlie Hochschild, The Managed Heart: The Commercialization of
Human Feeling 3d ed (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012) at 7-12 distinguished emotional labour
(sold for a wage, having exchange value, socially engineered, and managed top-down) from emotion work (done
in private, having use value), although she noted the gendered connections between them.
100
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that are fundamental to players’ sense of belonging, and to many employees’ enjoyment of the
work. Players became offended, over and over again, when the money they tried to exchange
by hand is treated as untrustworthy, because the trust is anchored not just in the cash as object,
but viscerally, in the act of passing it to another person with whom — in bingo but not casinos
— there had always been a sense of closeness and camaraderie.
Once the stakes of these new rules are clear, it is easier to understand why some players
reacted with consternation, and why some staff responded with farcical performances of
compliance. Part of what is being mocked is the distrust held by the regulator, experienced as
unfair by workers who have acted honestly for decades, channelling bingo proceeds to good
causes when governments were largely uninterested. In addition, however, their performances
sustain them, whether regulators are watching or not. In the face of rules cut and pasted from
corporate casino environments, and which are experienced as disproportionate to the risk
generated by bingo, workers re-make, if only for a little longer, a distinctive, more selforganized bingo environment. In sharing their stories, these workers reanimate non-casino
forms of play that are only in part about winning money, and are also about sociality, teasing,
bonding, and horizontal relations of mutuality.

VII. CONCLUSION: SOME LESSONS BEYOND BINGO AND
GAMBLING?
Bingo is a distinctive game, and bingo halls are distinctive gambling environments. This
distinctiveness stems from several sources, including the player demographics, the game’s
peculiar relationship to self-organized mutual aid and commercial entertainment, and the
regulatory framework through which it is governed. Given the widespread academic neglect of
the sector (a factor not unrelated to the demographics of its players), it is important to assert
that the changes affecting it matter in their own right: it is well past time that accounts of
gambling took bingo more seriously.
However in this article I have suggested that bingo also matters because of what it can
add to our socio-legal accounts of gambling. More precisely, attention to bingo shows that
standardized regulation, often derived from casinos, plays a key role in the erosion of local
gambling cultures. In Canada, rules are central to provincial efforts to restructure gambling
environments into casino-like forms, such that mutual aid practices are decentered, player and
worker senses of ownership are interrupted, and the efficient extraction of profit is maximized.
As governments have extended control over provincially licensed bingo, in alliance with
charities and businesses, a key concern has been to reign in unruly workers and players.
Notoriously stubborn bingo regulars, who act like they own the place, are being replaced by
machines, and employees are being subjected to much stricter surveillance mechanisms,
intended to stop them spreading money out all over the place, or being too close to players.
These examples may seem esoteric. However for me they shed helpful light on the
regulatory ways in which gambling becomes homogenized. It is not just that gambling
products, technologies, and environments are increasingly cut and paste from one place to
another, but that the rules are standardized as well. Diverse meanings of gambling are hereby
under threat from regulatory homogenization, specifically from the spread of rules anchored in
large-scale, profit-making play experiences. Corporate orientations to extracting revenue
efficiently are being gradually normalised, while other forms of play — involving notoriously
cantankerous players and non-compliant workers — are increasingly threatened. With smoking
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bans, for example, while there was no master plan to replace bingo-playing smokers with
gambling machines, over time this emerged as the most likely solution to the profit-crunch
occasioned by the need to banish smokers. Law and regulation land in ways that contribute to
the Las Vegasization of gambling environments, not in a straightforward or quick way, but
nonetheless perceptibly.
Simultaneously, however, consideration of bingo sheds light on the resistance to these
homogenizing rules. Although I have shown the effects of new regulations on workers and
players, I have tried to avoid an account that frames law as an all-powerful force impacting
passive recipients. While province-wide smoking bans seem to have been largely effective, in
compliance terms, dusting off rules were less so, and efforts to impose financial disclosure
rules on bingo workers have in some cases failed. (The variation in compliance levels is beyond
the scope of this article, although I suspect that it relates in part to the prevalence of shame in
the smoking example). I have examined how workers narrated their encounters with new
casino-based regulations, sometimes making fun, talking back, and sharing stories intended to
register a bingo-based defiance. For them, expensive camera systems cannot secure trust, and
there is a place for noisy occupation, defiant flasks and sandwiches, and women bringing in
babies. Bonds between players and workers are reaffirmed, not as bonds between services
providers (controlled by provinces, businesses, or charities) and clients, but as bonds between
participants in a mutual aid venture. These are not big law victories, by any means, and they will

not register in gambling law debates that focus on courtrooms or legislatures. However in an
everyday way these actions help reanimate alternative meanings of gambling, and — for that
reason alone — they are worth sharing more broadly.
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